01 · Why threats matter
Deterrence runs on words
Blackmail and threats are often implemented successfully where adversaries confront each other — an effective deterrence against noncompliance (Ellsberg, 1968; Read, 2020; Read & Hills, 2021). But here Virtual Bargaining alone hits a limit the chapter is explicit about: VB by itself cannot capture whether a potential threat can actually be implemented in a social interaction (Tingley & Walter, 2011). VB-ANBS adds the missing piece — the procedural asymmetry of who can speak in advance.
02 · The water bears the boat
When the threatener speaks first
An incumbent wants to deter an entrant from entering her market and can communicate a threat of fighting before choices are made. The chapter derives that when this procedural asymmetry sits in the incumbent's favor, her force ratio over the entrant exceeds 1 — an influence is exerted, and the threat becomes an effective entry deterrence.
The everyday analogue: in standoffs, hostage takers remind police of their ability to harm hostages if police intrude — and that reminder is often exactly what prevents noncompliance.
03 · The water swallows it
When the threatened speaks first
Flip the channel. The chapter shows the ability to communicate in advance can also prevent harm: if the would-be punishee can speak before the pair chooses, it nullifies the punisher's willingness to punish. The vehicle is the one-sided boobytrap game (Misyak & Chater, 2014): j chooses to cooperate or defect; i chooses to cooperate or buy a "boobytrap" — a cheap insurance that costs her a little regardless, but if j defects, the trap triggers and damages him more than her. Given the trap, j's best move is cooperation. A costly commitment, announced in advance, turns the threat's logic against the threatener.
Same channel, opposite effect — which is why this section of the chapter opens with the water-and-boat idiom. The panel's numbers are illustrative; the relationships are the chapter's.